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INTRODUCTION 
When Lisa Fairfax first asked me to think about the impact of top-
level women executives on their corporations, I paused. There were 
so many questions I wanted to ask. For example, are women-led com-
panies more family friendly than other companies? Are women-led 
companies more open to diversity initiatives? Are women-led compa-
nies more progressive than other companies in dealing with "stake-
holder" issues generally? Better (or worse) in adopting corporate 
governance best practices? Better (or worse) at bottom line perform-
ance? In short, are women-led companies distinctive in any consistent 
and detectable way? 
In setting out to find answers to these questions, I took as my 
database two lists of American business leaders: the "50 Most Powerful 
Women" identified by Fortune in October 20041 and the American 
"Women to Watch" identified by the Wall Street Journal the following 
month.2 Not surprisingly, there was considerable overlap on these 
* James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. Thanks to 
Arista Sims, Kerry Eaton, and Mark Carson, all of the William & Mary Class of 2005, for 
their work in connection with this and other projects. Thanks to Susan Grover, Lisa Nich-
olson, John Tucker, and Rich Hynes for their constructive suggestions during the prepara-
tion of this Article. Thanks, too, to Lisa Fairfax for organizing this wonderful Symposium. 
1. Ann Harrington & Petra Bartosiewicz, Who's Up? Who's Down?, FoRTUNE, Oct. 18, 
2004, at 181. 
2. Brooks Barnes et al., Women to Watch (A Special Repart): The Owners, WALL ST.j., Nov. 
8, 2004, at R8; Marilyn Chase, Women to Watch (A Special Repart): The Grant Giver, WALL ST.j., 
Nov. 8, 2004, at R9; John Hechinger et al., Women to Watch (A Special Repart): The Inheritors, 
WALL ST.]., Nov. 8, 2004, at R8; Scott Hensley et al., Women to Watch (A Special Report): In 
Line to Lead, WALL ST. ]., Nov. 8, 2004, at R5; Joann S. Lublin et al., Women to Watch (A 
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two lists, so the initial database consisted of sixty women, all of them at 
the top or near the top of their respective corporate pyramids. I will 
call these sixty women collectively the "Alpha Women."3 
I will call the companies by which the Alpha Women are em-
ployed, whether as CEO or in some significant subordinate role, 
"Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top." I focused particularly 
on those thirty-seven Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top 
that are publicly owned. 4 Of these thirty-seven companies, eight have 
(or had) women CEOs.5 I will call these women the "Elite Eight."6 
I began by asking whether Public Companies with an Alpha Wo-
man at the Top are distinguishable from other public companies-
those without an Alpha Woman at the top-on issues of stakeholder 
sensitivity. 7 To answer this question, I created a "Stakeholder Sensitiv-
ity Index" (SSI) with which I "graded" each of the Public Companies 
with an Alpha Woman at the Top, on a scale of 0-14.8 I then did the 
same with a control group of seventy-five companies without an Alpha 
Woman at the top.9 
I found that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the average SSI score of the Public Companies with an Alpha Woman 
at the Top (3.95) and that of the control group (2.28). This finding 
raises an inevitable question-does the presence of powerful women 
in the leadership account for the stronger stakeholder sensitivity 
scores of these companies or does the environment of stakeholder 
Special Report): The Watchdogs, WALL ST.j., Nov. 8, 2004, at R9; Pui-Wing Tam et al., Women 
to Watch (A Special Report): Running the Show, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at R3. 
3. The Alpha Women are listed in Appendix A. 
4. The Public Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top are listed in Appendix B. 
5. Since the Fortune and Wall Street journal articles were published, Carly Fiorina has 
been replaced as CEO of Hewlett-Packard Co. Pui-Wing Tam, Fallen Star: H-P's Board Ousts 
Fiorina as CEO; Amid Languishing Stock, Computer Chief Resists Pressure to Delegate; A Big 
Merger's Missed Coals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at Al. As it happens, another Alpha Wo-
man, Brenda Barnes, was appointed CEO of Sara Lee the day after Fiorina submitted her 
resignation. Janet Adamy, Sara Lee to Spin Off Apparel Arm, WALL ST.j., Feb. 11, 2005, atA5. 
6. The Elite Eight are Andreajung (Avon Prods., Inc.), Meg Whitman (eBay Inc.) , 
Carly Fiorina (Hewlett-Packard Co.), Pat Russo (Lucent Techs., Inc.), Susan lvey (Reynolds 
Am. Inc.), Mary Sammons (Rite Aid Corp.), Debra Cafaro (Ventas, Inc.), and Anne Mul-
cahy (Xerox Corp.). 
7. I will use the terms "stakeholders" and "other constituencies" interchangeably 
throughout this Article. Both terms may include suppliers, customers, employees, the local 
communities in which businesses are located, the environment generally, and subject-
matter interest groups. 
8. For details of the methodology of creating the SSI and the method of scoring, see 
infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra Part I. The results of these exercises are set out in Appendix B (Public 
Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top) and Appendix C (Control Group). 
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sensitivity account for these companies' willingness to promote senior 
women? I will return to this question in Part I. 
I also found that there is a wide range of SSI scores among the 
Public Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top and also among 
the eight public companies with an Alpha Woman CE0.10 Six of the 
thirty-seven Public Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top, and 
three of the Elite Eight companies, had an SSI score of zero. 11 The 
average SSI score for the Elite Eight companies (3.13) was signifi-
cantly lower than that of the other Public Companies with an Alpha 
Woman at the Top ( 4.17) .12 I will discuss these findings, and some 
possible explanations, in Part I. 
Turning from the issue of stakeholder sensitivity I then looked to 
see how the Elite Eight companies performed on more traditional 
measures of corporate governance quality. Several sources now rate 
and/ or rank companies according to their corporate governance 
characteristics.13 Though the specific metrics they use may differ, 14 all 
of these services try to bring objectivity to the task of assessing corpo-
rate governance quality. 
Using ratings provided by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. 
(ISS) and The Corporate Library, I compared the Elite Eight compa-
nies with their industries. I found that some of the Elite Eight compa-
nies score very well in the corporate governance rating systems while 
others are graded poorly.15 The same is true for these companies' 
financial perlormance.16 In other words, as in the case of the SSI 
10. See infra fig.l. 
11. See infra app. B. 
12. See infra app. B. 
13. GovernanceMetrics Intemationa1, Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (ISS), 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), Moody's Investor Sen':ice (Moody's), Stan-
dard & Poor's, and The Corporate Library all have proprietary rating systems which pur-
port to identifY best practices on issues of structure, process, and compensation. See 
GovemanceMetrics Intemational: Pioneering Accountability Ratings, http: / /www.gmirat-
ings.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); Institutional Shareholders Services Inc., Professional 
Services, http:/ /www.issproxy.com/professional/indexJsp (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); In-
vestor Responsibility Research Center, http:/ /www.irrc.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); 
Moody's Investor Service, http:/ / www.moodys.com (follow "about moody's" hyperlink) 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006); Standard & Poor's, Corporate Govemance Evaluations & 
Scores, http:/ /www2.standardandpoors.com (follow "Corporate Govemance Evaluations & 
Scores" hyperlink under "products A-Z") (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); The Corporate Li-
brary, Board Analyst, http:/ /www.boardanalyst.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
14. For example, Moody's focuses primarily on creditors' concems. See Ken Bertsch, 
How Moody's Assesses Corporate Governance, CoRP. GoVERNANCE ADVISOR, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 
12, 12-13. 
15. See infra Part II.A. 
16. See infra Part II.B. 
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scores, the results are mixed-one size does not fit all. I will discuss 
these findings further in Part II. 
Finally, I focused on the fact that three of the Elite Eight compa-
nies-Lucent Technologies, Inc., Xerox Corp., and Rite Aid Corp.-
are currently emerging from successful turnarounds after significant 
declines in shareholder value preceding the arrival of a woman CEO. 
That women were selected to lead these turnarounds is consistent 
with recent findings in the United Kingdom that "[w]omen are more 
likely to be appointed to precarious leadership positions than men." 17 
According to Michelle Ryan and Alexander Haslam of the U ni-
versity of Exeter, women are often assigned to top corporate positions 
only after a company's performance has faltered. 18 In British compa-
nies, Haslam has said, " [ w] omen were being parachuted into rather 
hazardous leadership positions. It seems that if it's all going swim-
mingly you can carry on with a 'jobs for the boys' approach, but if 
things get shaky you try something different. It means women who 
break through get landed with harder jobs."19 In Part III, I will con-
sider the role that Ryan and Haslam's "edge-of-the-cliff' theory may 
play when women become the heads of troubled companies. 
It is important to note that all three of these exercises-" grading" 
companies' stakeholder sensitivity on a uniform, easily replicable ba-
sis; comparing various measures of corporate governance quality; and 
looking at the narratives of three successful corporate rescues-are 
limited by the very small population of Public Companies with an Al-
pha Woman at the Top (thirty-seven) and the even smaller population 
of companies with an Alpha Woman CEO (eight) .20 While that limita-
tion makes it impossible to answer definitively any of the questions I 
have posed, the available data suggest tentative answers to some of 
those questions and provide baselines from which further research 
might be directed. 
I. ALPHA WoMEN AND STAKEHOLDER VALuEs 
One might surmise that Public Companies with an Alpha Woman 
at the Top would be more sensitive to stakeholder issues than men-led 
17. Mark Henderson, Women Who Break Through Glass Ceiling Face a Cliffhanger, TIMES 
(London), Sept. 7, 2004, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18. /d. 
19. /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, Ryan and Haslam found the 
same process occurring in law and politics. Women lawyers were often assigned to their 
firm's most difficult cases and a woman's chances of being selected by her party to chal-
lenge an incumbent politician were "proportional to the size of her opponent's majority." 
/d. 
20. See infra app. B. 
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companies. This is a theme I have heard in informal discussions, 
where scholars interested in "progressive corporate governance" have 
suggested that, because of women's relational strengths and empathy 
for others,21 they are likely to press for policies that are less preda-
cious toward workers and other constituencies than the shareholder-
oriented policies espoused by men. These scholars point to studies 
suggesting that women in positions of power often work at companies 
with enlightened work-life balance policies. 22 
That finding, of course, raises the chicken-and-egg problem-do 
women reconfigure their working environment after rising to the top 
of the pyramid, or do they rise to the top of the pyramid because they 
work in an environment that is already felicitous to women? We do 
not know the answer to this important question. A longitudinal study, 
or some qualitative fieldwork with these women, might help provide 
an answer. 23 
The same problem arises when asking about stakeholder sensitiv-
ity more broadly. That is, do women in positions of power tend to 
work at companies with a strong stakeholder-orientation, and if so, is 
that because powerful women move their companies toward improved 
stakeholder sensitivity or because women migrate to companies that 
are already stakeholder sensitive? Recognizing that I would not be 
able to answer the second of these questions solely through the use of 
publicly available data, I nevertheless set out to see what we could 
learn about the first of these questions. That is, what do we know 
about the stakeholder sensitivity of Public Companies with an Alpha 
Woman at the Top? 
To begin this exercise, I reviewed some recent press reports pur-
porting to identify American workplaces that are especially "family 
friendly,"24 "diversity friendly,"25 or just plain "employee friendly"26 in 
their policies. I also reviewed some additional studies purporting to 
21. See CARoL GJLLIGA..'I, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WoMEN's 
DEVELOPMENT 8 (1982) (noting common female traits developed early in their lives). 
22. See, e.g., Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: In-
vesting in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1255, 1349 
(2004) ("Catalyst states that corporations with more female executives and board members 
tend to have progressive work-family programs, although it cannot determine which comes 
first."). 
23. See Richard W. Leblanc, "What's Wrong with Corporate Governance: A Note, 12 CoRP. 
GoVERNANCE.: AN INT'L REv. 436, 436 (2004) (arguing that "[g]reater use of qualitative 
research methods-including observing boards in real time and interviewing directors-
needs to occur" if we are really to understand the dynamics of corporate governance). 
24. 100 Best Companies for Working Mothers, WoRKING MoTHER, available at http:/ / work-
ingwoman.com/bestlist.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
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identify "gay friendly" workplaces,27 "elder friendly" workplaces,28 the 
"most admired" companies (a concept that goes beyond economic 
performance),29 and the "best corporate citizens" in the United 
States.30 
I then reviewed several other possible measures of stakeholder 
sensitivity-the sixty-five companies that signed amicus briefs in favor 
of affirmative action policies at the University of Michigan in 2003,31 
the companies listed in Business Week's most recent report on notewor-
thy corporate philanthropists,32 those listed in the Domini 400 Social 
Index, 33 those listed in the Calvert Social Index, 34 those American 
companies listed in the ITSE 4 Good Index Series,35 and those listed 
in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (an index focused, in part, on 
environmental responsibility) .36 
From these listings, I created a Stakeholder Sensitivity Index 
(SSI), which provides a simple mechanism for comparing public com-
panies' responsiveness to stakeholder interests. Using the SSI, I as-
signed each of the Public Companies with an Alpha Woman at the 
Top an SSI score from 0-14.37 I then created a control group com-
prised of seventy-five public companies that do not have an Alpha 
25. Cora Daniels, 50 Best Companies for Minorities, FoRTUNE, June 28, 2004, at 136; Diver-
sity Inc, The 2004 Diversitylnc Top Companies for Diversity, http:/ /www.diversityinc.com/ 
members/6696.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
26. Robert Levering & Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies to Work For, FoRTUNE, 
Jan. 24, 2005, at 72. 
27. Gay.com, PlanetOut Partners' Best Companies to Work for 2003, http:/ /www.gay. 
com/business/article.html?sernum=308 (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
28. AARP's Best Employers for Workers over 50, AARP MAc., Nov. & Dec. 2004, available at 
http:/ /www.aarpmagazine.org/lifestyle/ Articles/a2004-09-22-mag-bestchart.html. 
29. Ann Harrington, America's Most Admired Companies, FoRTUNE, Mar. 8, 2004, at 80. 
30. 100 Best Corporate Citizens for 2004, Bus. ETHICS, Spring 2004, available at http:/ I 
www. business-ethics.com/ 1 OObest.htm. 
31. For a complete list of the amicus briefs submitted in support of the University of 
Michigan in Grutter v . Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), see University of Michigan, Admis-
sions Lawsuits, http:/ /www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/um.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
32. Jessi Hempel et al., Special Report: Philanthropy 2004: The Corporate Givers, Bus. WK., 
Nov. 29, 2004, at 100. 
33. Domini Social Investments, Domini 400 Social Index, http: / /www.domini.com/in-
dex.htm (follow "Domini 400 Social Index" hyperlink under "Domini Funds") (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2006). 
34. Calvert Online, Calvert Social Index, http:/ /www.calvert.com/sri_calvertindex.asp 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
35. FTSE The Index Company, FTSE4Good Index Series, http:/ /www.ftse.com/ lndi-
ces/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/indexJsp (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
36. Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, http:/ / www.sustainability-indexes.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 13, 2006) . 
37. See infra app. B. A company's SSI "score" is determined by the number of times a 
company appears on the designated lists and rankings. Each appearance equals one point. 
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Woman at the top.38 I also gave these companies an SSI score from 
0-14.39 









DISTRIBUTION oF SSI ScoREs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
SSI Score 
0 Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top 
• Companies with NO Alpha Women 
We see in this chart three important items: (I) fewer than one-
quarter (twenty-four percent) of the Public Companies with an Alpha 
Woman at the Top have an SSI score of zero or one, while nearly one-
half of the control group companies (forty-seven percent) have an SSI 
score of zero or one; (2) nearly one-half (forty-six percent) of the Pub-
lic Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top have an SSI score of 
five or above, while only fifteen percent of the control group compa-
nies have an SSI score of five or above; and (3) there is no discernible 
pattern to the SSI scores of the Public Companies with an Alpha Wo-
man at the Top, while the scores of the control group companies skew 
clearly to the left. 
There is more. On average, the Public Companies with an Alpha 
Woman at the Top score better than companies in the control group: 
3.95 for the former group versus 2.28 for the latter. But the average 
SSI score of the Elite Eight companies (3.13) is lower than that of the 
other Public Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top (4.17). 
The SSI scores of the Elite Eight companies look like this: 
38. These companies were selected randomly from Fortune 100 companies after elimi-
nating those companies with an Alpha Woman at the top. 
39. See infra app. C. 
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Elite Eight Company SSI Score 
Avon Prods., Inc. 5 
eBay Inc. 3 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 8 
Lucent Techs., Inc. 3 
Reynolds Am. Inc. 0 
Rite Aid Corp. 0 
Ventas, Inc. 0 
Xerox Corp. 6 
Two follow-up questions emerge from these data: what is the like-
lihood that the SSI scores of the Public Companies with an Alpha Wo-
man at the Top can be attributed to the efforts of the Alpha Women? 
What accounts for the lackluster SSI scores of several of the compa-
nies with an Alpha Woman CEO? The simple answer to both of these 
questions is "we don't know." 
There are several reasons to be skeptical, however, that Alpha 
Women can claim credit for (or are likely to improve) their compa-
nies' SSI scores. First, one can make a good argument that making 
stakeholder issues one's own is likely to be a career killer. That is, if 
top management privileges one set of values (shareholder primacy) 
and an ambitious mid-level manager embraces another set of values 
that is seen as antithetical to that of top management, that employee 
may well be diverted from her upward path. When coupled with the 
traditional discrimination and doubts about women's competence in 
corporate settings, a decision to embrace and advance stakeholder val-
ues is surely a risky venture. So, a woman who wishes to reach the 
uppermost strata of corporate management may be the very last per-
son to make the stakeholder case.40 She may be particularly reluctant 
to do so as she approaches the top. 
Second, it might be that stakeholder sensitivity is more a product 
of the type of company involved than the identity of the leader at the 
top of the company. That is, consumer product companies, compa-
nies in unionized industries, or companies whose products are envi-
ronmentally suspect, may need to be more stakeholder-sensitive than 
other companies. Women who make their careers in these types of 
40. Cf Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What 
Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1645, 1646 (2004) (observing that 
persons of color in high positions in the corporate hierarchy are unlikely to perform 
"door-opening" activities for others) . 
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companies may in fact embrace and advance stakeholder values be-
cause those values are important to the business's success, while wo-
men in other types of companies will find less of an incentive to do so. 
The fact that Procter & Gamble Co. has an SSI score of twelve and 
News Corp. has an SSI score of one may have more to do with the 
industries they are in than the fact that they each have an Alpha Wo-
man at the top. 
Third, upwardly mobile women, like upwardly mobile men, have 
to play the hand they are dealt. Even if they are in an industry where 
stakeholder values are seen as legitimate (where there is a serious la-
bor shortage, for example) and making the case for them is not seen 
as a career killer, not every woman can become a champion of those 
values. If she is the chief financial officer or group vice president for 
marketing, an employee may not have a platform from which to raise 
those issues upon which the SSI score is based. Decisions to sign an 
amicus brief in Grutter v. Bollinger,41 for example, or to develop a work-
place hospitable to older workers, may simply be outside of the em-
ployee's ambit of influence or expertise. 
Fourth, even where a woman reaches the top of the corporate 
pyramid-as the Elite Eight did in becoming CEOs-she, like her 
male counterparts, is going to have to prioritize. Not every CEO has 
the flexibility or the opportunity to advance other-constituency issues. 
Particularly where a company is struggling, becoming diversity 
friendly or setting aside money for high-profile philanthropy may be 
an impossible luxury, at least in the short run. And, as I will discuss 
further in Part III, women are often put in charge of struggling com-
panies. Their challenge is to save the company (and secondarily to 
keep their job), not to create an ideal working environment. Thus, it 
should be no surprise that Rite Aid Corp. (SSI score = zero) has fared 
so poorly in establishing a stakeholder-sensitive profile. It is impres-
sive, on the other hand, that Xerox Corp. (SSI score = six) has done 
so well. 
Finally, there is the problem of isolation. Of the thirty-seven Pul:r 
lie Companies with an Alpha Woman at the Top, only eight have two 
Alpha Women at the top,42 and not one of them has three Alpha Wo-
men at the top. An executive seeking to advance stakeholder values-
even a top-level executive-simply cannot do it alone. 
41. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
42. The companies with two Alpha Women at the top are Citigroup, Inc., Genentech, 
Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., PepsiCo, Inc., Procter & Gamble Co., Viacom Int'l Inc., Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., and Xerox Corp. 
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There is one more factor to consider in looking at the data. That 
is, assume arguendo that Alpha Women generally, and particularly Al-
pha Women CEOs, really are committed to stakeholder values.43 The 
SSI scores of the Elite Eight companies may not reflect that commit-
ment. These women, after all, have a very short track record. Meg 
Whitman has the longest tenure of the group-she was appointed 
eBay Inc.'s CEO in March 1998. Half of the Alpha Women CEOs-
Susan Ivey of Reynolds American Inc., Anne Mulcahy of Xerox Corp., 
Pat Russo of Lucent Technologies, Inc., and Mary Sammons of Rite 
Aid Corp.-have been appointed CEO within the past four years.44 
Do these data, in short, tell us anything about the impact of Al-
pha Women on their workplaces? Probably not. The sample is small, 
the sources for the SSI may be biased (especially in favor of high-
profile, Fortune 100-type companies), and each company has a 
unique culture, which (with the possible exception of eBay Inc.) was 
shaped by the male CEOs who preceded the arrival of the Alpha Wo-
men. For now, I would suggest that the SSI is a useful tool for track-
ing stakeholder sensitivity issues over time, that additional measures 
can and should be developed, 45 and that scholars should dig more 
deeply into the relationship between Alpha Women at the top of a 
corporate pyramid and the presence or absence of stakeholder values. 
With that preface, however, let me offer these additional 
thoughts and impressions. First, some of the most successful Alpha 
Women may not be interested in stakeholder issues; some may be in-
terested in or even committed to them but save their influence for 
other more compelling issues, including their personal career ad-
vancement; and some Alpha Women may seek to advance stakeholder 
claims but do so ineffectively. 
Second, the most likely explanation for the difference between 
the average SSI score of the Public Companies with an Alpha Woman 
at the Top and those without an Alpha Woman is an environmental 
one. That is, the presence of Alpha Women in high-scoring compa-
43. I do not make that assumption, by the way. My sense is that the Elite Eight CEOs 
a re very different individuals, with a wide range of political and social values. Some may 
indeed be stakeholder oriented and others probably are not. 
44. The dates of appointment are: Meg Whitman (eBay Inc.), March 1998; Debra 
Cafaro (Ventas, Inc.), March 1999; Carly Fiorina (Hewlett-Packard Co.),July 1999; Andrea 
Jung (Avon Prods., Inc.), November 1999; Anne Mulcahy (Xerox Corp.), August 2001; Pat 
Russo (Lucent Techs., Inc.) , January 2002; Mary Sammons (Rite Aid Corp.), June 2003; 
Susan lvey (Reynolds Am. Inc.), January 2004. 
45. See generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Carparate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1197 ( 1999) (advocating increased social disclosure 
by public companies). 
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nies is likely to be the product of a corporate mindset that values both 
stakeholder claims and diversity in the workforce. Alpha Women at 
the top, in short, are an effect, rather than the cause, of the high SSI 
scores. 
Third, the most likely explanation for the wide distribution of SSI 
scores among companies with an Alpha Woman CEO at the top . is 
random chance. 
II. ALPHA WoMEN-LED CoMPANIES AND CoRPORATE 
GoVERNANCE QUALITI' 
Quite apart from the issue of stakeholder sensitivity, there is the 
question of whether companies with an Alpha Woman at the top 
more closely adhere to corporate governance "best practices" than 
companies without an Alpha Woman at the top. One might think so, 
in part because women are more likely than men to be attentive to 
process values46 and in part because effecting meaningful changes in 
corporate governance requires listening, diplomacy, and effective coa-
lition-building, skills at which women executives are thought to ex-
cel.47 One way to judge adherence to corporate governance "best 
practices" is through the more-or-less objective ratings prepared by 
shareholder consultants. 
A. The Ratings 
In this Part, I will focus on the eight public companies with an 
Alpha Woman CE0.48 To assess the corporate governance quality of 
the Elite Eight companies, I called on the expertise of Institutional 
46. See, e.g., Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom 18 
(Stockholm Sch. of Econ. & ECGI, Finance Working Paper No. 57/2004, 2004), available at 
http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=594506 (noting women have better attendance records at board 
meetings than men). 
47. It is said, for example, that women are better listeners than men, interrupt others 
less frequently in meetings, and are generally more inclusive than men in gathering infor-
mation. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Law-
yers? An Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 785, 839 (2004) (noting that "studies have 
consistently found that women are better decoders and encoders of nonverbal communica-
tion, such as facial expressions, body language, and vocal cues" than men). 
48. I focus on the Elite Eight companies because of the deference paid by most boards 
to their CEOs. See generally Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral 
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 724-32 (2005). 
It is a fair question, of course, whether boards are as deferential to women CEOs as they 
are to men or whether there is a "gender discount." 
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Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) 49 and one of its competitors, The Cor-
porate Library. 50 
ISS uses a proprietary system by which it rates and then ranks 
public companies' governance practices.51 ISS provides two figures 
for each company. The first, the Index Corporate Governance Quo-
tient (Index CGQ), identifies the percentile ranking of each company 
as compared to the overall index (S&P 500, Russell 3000, etc.) on 
which it is found. 52 The second, the Industry Corporate Governance 
Quotient (Industry CGQ), identifies the percentile ranking of each 
company as compared to other companies in its industry sector 
(pharmaceuticals, food & beverage, media, etc.).53 
The Corporate Library uses a different system. The "Board Effec-
tiveness Rating" (on a score of A-F) is "based on a small number of 
proven dynamic indicators of special interest to shareholders,"54 
which are then adjusted by a professional analyst. 55 The "Best Prac-
tices Compliance Score" is not a rating or assessment, but a tally of 
each company's compliance with eighteen commonly cited corporate 
governance "best practices."56 
Here are the results of ISS's and The Corporate Library's review 
of the companies with an Alpha Woman CEO: 
49. My thanks to Stephen Deane, Vice President and Director of Publications at ISS, 
who facilitated my access to the ISS data. 
50. My thanks to Nell Minow, Founder and Editor of The Corporate Library, who facil-
itated my access to The Corporate Library data. 
51. At the time of my research, the ISS rating system was based on eight "core topics": 
" ( 1) board structure and composition, (2) audit issues, (3) charter and bylaw provisions, 
(4) laws of the state of incorporation, (5) executive and director compensation, (6) quali-
tative factors, (7) D&O stock ownership, and (8) director education. The score for each 
core topic reflects a set of key governance variables." Institutional Shareholder Services, 
ISS Corporate Governance Quotient, http:/ /www.isscgq.com/abouttheratings.htm (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
52. Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ), 
http:/ /www.issproxy.com/institutional/analytics/cgqjsp (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
53. /d. 
54. The Corporate Library, Board Effectiveness Ratings, http:/ /www.thecorporateli-
brary.com/Products-and-Services/board-effectiveness-ratings.html (last visited Feb. 13, 
2006). These indicators include board composition, CEO compensation, shareholder re-
sponsiveness, litigation and regulatory problems, takeover defenses, accounting practices, 
strategic decisionmaking, and "problem directors." /d. 
55. /d. 
56. /d. (follow "Best Practices Compliance Score" hyperlink). "Companies with strong 
grades in this category have simply demonstrated a high degree of compliance with a sim-
plified list of commonly recognized best practices, based primarily on the OECD model." 
/d. 
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TABLE X 
CoRPORATE GoVERNANCE QuALIIT IN CoMPANIEs HEADED BY THE 
ELITE EIGHT CEOs 
The Corporate The Corporate 
ISS ISS Library-Board Library-Best 
Index Industry Effectiveness Practices 
Company CGQ CGQ Rating Compliance Score 
Avon Prods., Inc. 23.3 78.4 c 83% 
eBay Inc. 75.0 95.1 B 75% 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 79.3 97.5 c 85% 
Lucent Tech., Inc. 13.5 67.8 F 71% 
Reynolds Am. Inc. 82.6 95.0 c 56% 
Rite Aid Corp. 33.2 36.0 D 78% 
Ventas, Inc. 99.0 96.1 c 82% 
Xerox Corp. 75.8 96.9 D 71% 
One must begin with the observation that there is no one pattern 
for the Elite Eight companies. Nor is there always consistency be-
tween the rating and ranking systems. That being said, there are 
three additional points that can be made about these data: ( 1) there is 
no obvious relationship between corporate governance quality and 
stakeholder sensitivity,57 (2) there is no obvious relationship between 
corporate governance quality and actual corporate performance,58 
and (3) there is no obvious relationship between corporate govern-
ance quality and CEO longevity. 59 
There does appear to be some evidence, especially in the ISS 
rankings, to support the proposition that companies with an Alpha 
Woman CEO do a better than average job of adopting corporate gov-
ernance "best practices." Seven of the Elite Eight companies have ISS 
Industry CGQ scores well above the mean for their industry and five of 
them are in the ninetieth percentile or above.60 All eight of the Elite 
Eight companies scored above fifty percent on The Corporate Li-
brary's Best Practices Compliance scale and five of them have scores 
of seventy-five percent or above.61 
Do these data tell us anything about the impact of Alpha Women 
on traditional corporate governance practices? As in the case of the 
SSI, we see some intriguing correlations but no evidence of cause and 
57. See supra Part I. 
58. See infra Part II.B. 
59. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra tbl.X. 
61. See supra tbl.X. 
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effect. Still I think we can say this: although the sample is awfully 
small,62 there is some evidence that Alpha Women CEOs have im-
proved corporate governance within their companies.63 It may be 
that the Alpha Women CEOs of those poorly scoring companies that 
have emerged from a turnaround (e.g., Lucent Technologies, Inc. or 
Rite Aid Corp.), may now be able to turn their attention to improving 
corporate governance practices too. 
As a bottom line to this Part, I would suggest that Alpha Women's 
relationship to corporate governance quality is much like their rela-
tionship to measures of stakeholder sensitivity-they may not be 
much interested in the subject, they may be interested but defer ac-
tion because the political cost of initiating action is likely to outweigh 
the foreseeable benefits (or because other higher-priority issues com-
mand their attention), or they may fight for change and fail. Still, 
there is often an observable relationship between corporate govern-
ance "best practices" and Alpha Women at the Top. Here, too, is an 
area for further research. 
B. Corporate Performance 
For some observers, the question of corporate governance "qual-
ity" is irrelevant. They want to know how the company has performed 
financially, both absolutely and in comparison to its peers. As illus-
trated below, I asked The Corporate Library to gather this informa-
tion for the companies with an Alpha Woman CEO. Four of these 
companies (Avon Products, Inc., eBay Inc., Reynolds American Inc., 
and Ventas, Inc.) have been consistent industry over-performers.64 
Two of them (Hewlett-Packard Co. and Rite Aid Corp.) have been 
consistent industry under-performers.65 The other two (Lucent Tech-
nologies, Inc. and Xerox Corp.) have had a mixed performance, 
largely as a result of the dramatic turnarounds orchestrated by their 
Alpha Women CEOs.66 We will look more at these turnaround stories 
in Part III. 
62. See supra Part I (discussing several reasons why women in corporate governance 
may be unwilling, unable, or reluctant to generate institutional change). 
63. In 2004, according to The Corporate Library, both Hewlett-Packard Co. and Rite 
Aid Corp. improved their Board Effectiveness Rating from the preceding year-in Hewlett-
Packard's case from D to C and in Rite Aid's case from F to D. At the same time, the Board 
Effectiveness Rating for Lucent Techs., Inc. declined from D to F. ld. 
64. See infra tbl.Y. 
65. See infra tbl.Y. 
66. See infra tbl.Y. 
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TABLE y 
SHAREHOLDER RETURN AS OF 12/31/04 
5 year Industry 3 year Industry 1 year Industry 
Avon Prods., Inc. 147.45 57.55 72.39 69.80 16.33 13.31 
eBay Inc. 271.69 98.09 247.80 139.90 80.07 37.21 
Hewlett-Packard Co. -60.46 38.32 6.38 73.16 -7.66 11.65 
Lucent Techs., Inc. -94.83 -25.40 -40.32 40.53 32.39 12.79 
Reynolds Am. Inc. 441.41 119.76 58.17 67.55 41.70 32.24 
Rite Aid Corp. -67.12 19.48 -27.67 175.45 -39.40 16.19 
Ventas, Inc. 677.09 54.30 167.22 34.07 30.50 12.52 
Xerox Corp. -21.95 68.84 63.24 73.41 23.26 19.17 
III. ALPHA WoMEN AT THE EncE OF THE CuFF 
In this final Part, I will examine a provocative theory recently 
floated by scholars in the United Kingdom known as the "glass cliff' 
theory. Following publication of a study suggesting that the presence 
of women on boards of directors was associated with poor corporate 
performance,67 psychologists Michelle Ryan and Alexander Haslam 
set out to dig deeper into the data.68 Though one might surmise that 
there is a causal relationship between the presence of women on the 
board and poor corporate performance, Ryan and Haslam hypothe-
sized an alternative scenario: "rather than the appointment of women 
leaders precipitating a drop in company performance, it is equally 
plausible that a company's poor performance could be a trigger for 
the appointment of women to the board."69 This would lead to wo-
men achieving positions of power when the risk of failure was espe-
cially high. 
In a nutshell, Ryan and Haslam found that women's leadership 
appointments were typically made "in problematic organizational cir-
cumstances and hence [were] more precarious" than men's appoint-
ments. 70 In addition, because of the intense attention paid in the 
press to women business leaders, "women who assume leadership of-
fices may be differentially exposed to criticism and in greater danger 
67. See Elizabeth judge, Women on Board: Help or Hindrance?, TJMES (London) , Nov. 11, 
2003, at B2l. 
68. Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff: Evidence That Women Are 
Over-Represented in Precarious Leadership Positions, 16 BRITISH J. McMT. 81 (2005). 
69. /d. at 83. 
70. /d. at 87. 
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[than men] of being apportioned blame for negative outcomes that 
were set in train well before they assumed their new roles."71 
There are two important aspects of Ryan and Haslam's findings: 
First, women are often promoted into the most risky jobs, and second, 
women may then be singled out as the cause of institutional failure. 
The importance of this second element of the "glass cliff' theory for 
women is that boards of directors are increasingly impatient. "Boards, 
less tolerant of failure [than a decade ago], are giving CEOs an aver-
age of 18 months to prove themselves."72 As a result, CEO turnover 
has more than doubled since 2002.73 This phenomenon may have a 
special impact on women. 74 
Ryan and Haslam consider two possible explanations for the 
"glass cliff' appointments they describe in their study-first, that deci-
sionmakers may offer high-risk positions to women "because they are 
seen to have less to lose [than men] ,"75 and second, that "women may 
be placed in, and evaluated more positively for, challenging positions 
simply because they are viewed as better suited to these roles. "76 I will 
call these explanations, respectively, the "oh, what the hell?" scenario 
and the 'Jack Russell" scenario. Like the terriers for which they are 
named, Jack Russell candidates are "a big dog in a little body," and 
valued for their tenacity and skills. 
When the stakes are high, the oh, what the hell? scenario seems 
unlikely to me as an explanation for CEO selection. 77 The Jack Rus-
sell scenario, on the other hand, may well represent the meritocratic 
ideal. 
In the following pages, I will sketch out three stories that seem to 
illustrate Ryan and Haslam's "glass cliff' theory. That is, in each case, 
a woman was appointed CEO after a man (or men) had presided over 
a serious decline in the company's fortunes. In each case, the risk of 
failure was high. 
71. ld. 
72. Louis Lavelle, Brisk Turnover in CEOs, Bus. WK., Mar. 7, 2005, at 14. 
73. ld. 
74. See Kimberly Blanton, Above Glass Ceiling the Footing Is Fragile: Factors Appear to Work 
Against Longer Tenure for Women CEOs, BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2005, at D1 ("The average 
chief executive of the world's largest publicly traded companies holds his job for 8.2 years, 
while women stay 4.8 years, according to a study by Booz Allen Hamilton.") . 
75. Julie S. Ashby et al., Legal Work and the Glass Cliff Evidence That Women Are Preferen-
tially Selected to Lead Problematic Cases 17 (April 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
76. ld. 
77. CEO selection typically involves unreasonably high, rather than low, expectations. 
See generally RAKEsH KHuRANA, SEARCHING FOR A CoRPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QuEST 
FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs (2002). 
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The first of these turnaround stories involves Pat Russo of Lucent 
Technologies, Inc. The story begins with the bursting of the telecom 
bubble in 2000-2001. As the industry entered a "global depression,"78 
Lucent's client base dried up.79 Faced with the need to reposition the 
company, as well as a "massive brain drain" of talent,80 Lucent's board 
set out to find a new, transformative CEO. 
Business Week described Lucent's CEO search as follows: 
It appeared to be the big job no one wanted . .... James 
McNerney Jr., a finalist in the race to head General Electric 
Co., was contacted. He opted to run 3M instead. Intel Corp. 
and Nortel Networks Corp. veteran David House politely de-
clined. Nor could Alcatel honcho Krish Prabhu be per-
suaded. Finally, on Jan. 7, company veteran Patricia F. 
Russo, who only eight months earlier took the No. 2 spot at 
Eastman Kodak Co., agreed to step into the breach.81 
According to another source, "Lucent was hard-pressed to find 
[an outsider] ... willing to take on the challenge of righting the com-
pany's ills. You've got to ask, 'who [else] could you have gotten to 
take on this mess?' "82 When Russo arrived, "expectations for the com-
pany [were] at an all-time low. "83 
The second turnaround story involves Anne Mulcahy of Xerox 
Corp. Mulcahy was promoted to CEO in August of 2001, at a time 
when the company was "in terrible shape."84 Mulcahy previously had 
served as President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the com-
pany and replaced CEO G. Richard Thoman who, after thirteen 
months in the job, had "flamed out."85 The company "was on the 
78. Steve Rosenbush et al., The Telecom Depression When Will It End?, Bus. WK., Oct. 7, 
2002, at 66. 
79. !d. at 66-68. 
80. Steve Rosen bush & John Shinal, Lucent: "A Large Battleship with Gaping Holes," Bus. 
WK., Oct. 23, 2000, at 42. 
81. Steve Rosenbush & Geoff Smith, A Lengthy Honeymoon at Lucent?, Bus. WK., Jan. 21 , 
2002, at 34. 
82. Rex Crum, Lucent Names Russo CEO as Restructuring Continues, TBR, Jan. 7, 2002, 
h up:/ I www. tbri.com/ News/ pgViewArticle.asp?ld=60. 
83. Rosenbush & Smith, supra note 81 , at 34. According to Fortune, Russo's assignment 
as the new CEO was "one of the toughest, most closely watched corporate repair jobs in 
America today." Stephanie N. Mehta, Pat Russo's Lucent Vision: The New CEO Must Turn 
Lucent Around in the Midst of a Brutal Storm. Can She Deliver?, FoRTUNE, Apr. 15, 2002, at 126. 
84. Special Report: The Best & Worst Managers of 2004: Anne Mulcahy; Xerox, Bus. WK., 
Jan. 10, 2005, at 62 [hereinafter Best Managers: Anne Mulcahy] . 
85. !d. 
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brink of filing for bankruptcy-or being taken over."86 It "looked [to 
many] like a lost cause."87 
The third turnaround story involves Mary Sammons of Rite Aid 
Corp. Sammons came to Rite Aid in December 1999 as part of a team 
recruited from Fred Meyer Inc. to rescue the ailing drug store chain.88 
The team, including a new CEO, chief financial officer, and chief ad-
ministrative officer, also included Sammons as President and C00.89 
It was, according to an industry observer, a "tumultuous time" in the 
company's history.90 
Its stock price had bottomed out, three of its top execu-
tives-including chief executive officer Martin Grass-had 
departed, its board of directors had been overhauled, and 
the company's longtime auditor said it had lost faith in the 
chain's ability to give honest financial data. 
And the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
had initiated a formal investigation into Rite Aid's account-
ing practices. Eventually Rite Aid would have to restate $1.6 
billion in earnings.91 
Sammons was named CEO in June 2003.92 
Each of these stories-Lucent Technologies, Inc., Xerox Corp., 
and Rite Aid Corp.-seems to confirm Ryan and Haslam's observation 
that women are often given "no-win" assignments. What is remarkable 
about these stories is that each of these women performed so well. 
Xerox Corp. returned to profitability in the fourth quarter of 2001.93 
Lucent Technologies, Inc. did so in 2003.94 Rite Aid Corp. did so in 
2004.95 Anne Mulcahy was named one of Business Week's "Best Manag-
ers" of 2005.96 Pat Russo was lauded too.97 
What accounts for these women's successes? Once again, the an-
swer is "we don't know." There were no reporters (or bloggers) on 
the inside, capturing the leadership style of these women or the tough 
86. Gene Marcial, Xerox' Image Is Getting Crisper, Bus. WK., Dec. 2, 2002, at 122. 
87. Jon Birger, Xerox Turns a New Page, MONEY, Apr. 1, 2004, at 115. 




92. Rite Aid Team Accomplishes the Impossible, CHAIN DRuG REv., Dec. 20, 2004, at 88. 
93. Results Xerox Hopes to Duplicate, Bus. WK., Feb. 11, 2002, at 46. 
94. Lucent: Back in the Black, Bus. WK., Nov. 3, 2003, at 44. 
95. Rite Aid in Black Again, Posts First Annual Profit Since '97, CI-WN DRUG REv., Apr. 26, 
2004, al 29. 
96. Best Managers: Anne Mulcahy, supra note 84, at 62. 
97. Special Report: The Best & Worst Managers of 2004: Managers to Watch, Bus. WK., Jan. 
10, 2005, at 59. 
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decisions they had to make. Still, there are some hints in the public 
record. Pat Russo was successful at Lucent Technologies, Inc., in part, 
because she "under[stood] how Lucent work[ed] and how to make 
things happen."98 She was also legendarily competitive.99 
In addition, however, Russo was seen by her board as a "high-
integrity, inspiring team builder"100 and "the very antithesis of the 
back-slapping, rah-rah CEOs to whom [many] companies turn when 
they're looking for a quick fix." 101 Observers described her as 
"grounded and devoted to her family."102 In her first few weeks on 
the job, she personally visited nineteen of Lucent's most important 
customers.103 Then, she followed up on their complaints. "'She was 
in my office the first week,' [remembers] Paul Lacouture, president of 
the Network Services Group at Verizon ... 'And she listened."'104 
Anne Mulcahy ascended to the CEO position at Xerox Corp. with 
little grooming for the job.105 She did have deep roots in the com-
pany, however (her husband and brother were both executives there), 
and she had "years of experience dealing with [Xerox's] custom-
ers."106 In addition-like Russo-she was a tireless traveler. "During 
her first three months [as Xerox's president], she crisscrossed the 
country, holding nearly two dozen meetings with employees. She 
even promised to fly anywhere, anytime to help salespeople close 
tough deals."107 
98. Olga Kharif, Patricia Russo: Lucent's Best Hope?, BusiNEss WEEK ONLINE, May 29, 2003, 
http:/ /www.businessweek.com/technology I content/ may2003/tc20030529_9745_tclll. 
htm. 
99. Russo is said to be among the top CEO golfers in the country. See Del Jones, 
McNealy Topples from Top of CEO Golfers List, USA ToDAY, Sept. 7, 2004, at 1B (reporting on 
Gold Digest's CEO golf rankings). 
100. Betsy S. Atkins, "What to Look for When Hiring a CEO: The Most Critical Skills Are the 
Ones You Can't Quantify, CHIEF ExECUTIVE, May 2004, available at http:/ / www.chiefexecu-
tive.net (search "Betsy S. Atkins"; then follow "What to Look for When Hiring a CEO" 
hyperlink) . 
101. Mehta, supra note 83, at 126. 
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103. Id. 
104. Kharif, supra note 98. 
105. See Betsy Morris, The Accidental CEO: She Was Never Groomed to Be the Boss. But Anne 
Mulcahy Is Bringing Xerox Back from the Dead, FoRTUNE, June 23, 2003, at 58 (noting that 
Mulcahy had not punched the traditional tickets required of a CEO candidate). "Even 
today, after 3 1/2 years running [the company], Mulcahy, 52, seems a little surprised that 
fate brought her to this spot." Best Managers: Anne Mulcahy, supra note 84, at 62. 
106. Pamela L. Moore, She's Here to Fix the Xerox: Can Anne Mulcahy Pull Off an IBM-Style 
Makeover?, Bus. WK., Aug. 6, 2001 , at 47. 
107. Id. In her first year as CEO, Mulcahy logged 100,000 miles visiting Xerox outposts. 
Olga Kharif, Anne Mulcahy Has Xerox by the Horns: The CEO Launched the Ailing Copier Giant's 
Turnaround by Cutting Costs, Emphasizing Clients, and Boosting Morale, BusiNESS WEEK ONLINE, 
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In 2002, Mulcahy met with fifty CEOs of Xerox's client compa-
nies.108 "Responding to their feedback, she ... lowered prices."109 
She acted decisively in other areas, too-she successfully disposed of a 
$6 billion accounting problem with the SEC and cut the payroll by 
13,600 jobs.110 
Still, Mulcahy was seen as having her feet planted firmly on the 
ground. According to Fortune, Mulcahy not only carries her own gar-
ment bag onto the corporate jet, she "becomes a flight attendant the 
minute the seatbelt sign goes off (Xerox laid off the real one). 'Beer? 
Wine? Soft drinks?' she asks, handing out napkins. 'I cook more here 
than I do at home,' she adds."111 
Sammons' story has some similar features. Coming to Rite Aid 
Corp. from the outside as part of a team, she set out "to reestablish 
pride in a workforce that had become demoralized."112 She launched 
customer-service training and a program called "SMILE (Say thank 
you, Make eye contact, Introduce yourself, Listen to the customer, Ex-
press thanks)."113 She coined. the slogan, "Make a Difference. Make it 
Personal."114 She focused unrelentingly on service and the customer 
experience.115 
Recognized for her "obsessive work habits," Sammons was also 
praised for her "minimum of self-aggrandizement."116 She and Bob 
Miller, the CEO who preceded her, "approached their work without 
letting egos get in their way."117 
These three stories are worth reviewing. While there is no single 
style, no single strategy, and no single lesson to be learned from these 
Alpha Women, they do share some characteristics-commitment, fo-
cus, a "theme" to their leadership, industry, down-to-earthness, and 
stunning physical endurance. 
These stories also suggest that, in times of crisis, women may pos-
sess the attributes required to achieve a successful business tum-
May 29, 2003, http:/ /www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2003/tc20030529_ 
1642_tclll.htm. 
I 08. Kharif, supra note 98. 
109. Id. 
llO. Marcial, supra note 86, at 122. 
111. Morris, supra note 105, at 58. 
ll2. Rite Aid Team Accomplishes the Impossible, supra note 92, at 88. 
ll3. Id. 
114. Mike Vogel, Sammons Challenges Rite Aid to Be Even Better, CHAIN DRuG REv., Aug. 30, 
2004, at 3. 
115. Rite Aid Team Accomplishes the Impossible, supra note 92, at 88. 
116. David Pinto, Sammons Loves What She Does-and It Shows, CHAIN DRUG REv., Apr. 26, 
2004, at 34. 
117. Rite Aid Team Accomplishes the Impossible, supra note 92, at 88. 
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around-quiet, determined, consistent leadership. At least we know 
that Pat Russo, Anne Mulcahy, and Mary Sammons-among a tiny 
handful of women CEOs-each accomplished a corporate resurrec-
tion few believed was possible. That is a remarkable record. 118 
In the end, though, do these three stories tell us anything about 
the impact of Alpha Women on their workplaces in times of crisis? 
Perhaps only this: Alpha Women are sometimes tapped for what ap-
pear (at least to men) to be impossible jobs at the COO or CEO level. 
These women sometimes exceed all expectations by employing some 
combination of gender-neutral competencies (e.g., a deeply embed-
ded knowledge of the company's products) and arguably more 
gendered characteristics (e.g., emotional intelligence, strong listening 
skills). But these women's skill sets, like the companies they lead, are 
all different. And, of course, some of these women fail. 
CoNcLusioN 
Scholars have tried for years to essentialize women and also to 
identify "unique" women's management sk.ills.119 We know now, of 
course, that it cannot be done. 12° Carly Fiorina is not Anne Mulcahy. 
Pat Russo is not Andrea Jung. Mary Sammons is not Meg Whitman. 
And none of them is Jack Welsh. 
In fact, we do not know nearly enough about successful Alpha 
Women-how they were socialized in childhood, how they sustained 
their ambition in the face of failure and setback, the role of family and 
118. One must, of course, ask whether the failure of Carly Fiorina at Hewlett-Packard 
Co. might not offset some of these stories. Like Russo, Mulcahy, and Sammons, Fiorina 
was brought in to serve as a transformative CEO. See George Anders, H-P's Board Ousts 
Fiorina as CEO; How Traits That Helped Executive Climb Ladder Came to Be Fatal Flaws; 'You 
Learn to Be Self-Reliant,' WALL ST.]., Feb. 10, 2005, at AI ("Directors had bet heavily 51/2 
years ago that she, an outsider from Lucent Technologies, Inc., would be the dynamic cure 
for H-P's stodginess at the time."). Fiorina was said to be stubbom and resistant to the 
direction she was getting from her board of directors. She was also criticized as "too flam-
boyant," too absorbed in her "rock star" image, and too distracted by "globetrotting" to 
focus on execution. See Louis Lavelle, Three Simple Rules Carly Ignored, Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 
2005, at 46 (describing the conflict between Fiorina and the board of directors); see also Bill 
Saporito et al., Why Carlys Out; HP's Ousted CEO, Carty Fiorina, Tried to Revive the Silicon Valley 
Legend with the Vision Thing. What the Company Needs Is Far More Fundamenta~ TIME, Feb. 21, 
2005, at 34. 
119. See, e.g., judy B. Rosener, Ways Women Lead, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 119 
(discussing the differing management styles of male and female business leaders). 
120. See, e.g., Juov WAJCMAN, MANAGING LIKE A MAN: WoMEN At"'D MEN tN CoRPORATE 
MANAGEMENT 56 (1998) ("In fact, the similarities between women and men [in senior man-
agement positions] far outweigh the differences between women and men as groups.");]. 
Brad Chapman, Comparison of Male and Female Leadership Styles, 18 ACAo. MGMT. J. 645, 646 
(1975) ("There is no significant difference between male and female leadership styles."). 
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peer support, the role of mentors, the role of money, the role of val-
ues, the role of luck and timing, and the role of "time-outs" and sab-
baticals during one's career. We cannot yet judge the importance of 
formal education/21 the decision to forego having children,122 lateral 
career moves, 123 or specific assignments on the way to the top. 124 
We do know that Alpha Women are unlikely to be any more "in-
tuitive" than their male counterparts.125 Nor are they any less commit-
ted to their careers. 126 
What scholars need to do now is to get closer to these Alpha Wo-
men and those we might categorize as "nearly made it, but didn't 
quite." Structured interviews, open-ended dialogs, questionnaires and 
self-assessment instruments, roundtable discussions, interviews with 
subordinates, and ethnological studies of all types would help us un-
derstand this small world better. 
This is not a project exclusively for management scholars, sociolo-
gists, anthropologists, or (least of all) law professors. It is very much a 
multidisciplinary project, much in the spirit of this wonderful 
Symposium. 
121. Of the Elite Eight, only three-Carly Fiorina, Susan lvey, and Meg Whitman-have 
an MBA. Debra Cafaro was trained as a lawyer. Andrea Jung studied English literature; 
Anne Mulcahy studied math and journalism; Pat Russo studied political science and his-
tory; and Mary Sammons majored in French. 
122. Of the Elite Eight, only three-Andreajung, Anne Mulcahy, and Meg Whitman-
have children (each of them has two children), so far as public sources reveal. 
123. Of the Elite Eight, only one-Anne Mulcahy-worked for the same company 
throughout her career. The rest have moved around. 
124. Anne Mulcahy served for years as Vice President for Human Resources at Xerox. 
Pat Russo, too, served a term as a Human Resources executive at AT&T. Most people think 
of HR as a dead-end job. 
125. See john Hayes et al., Intuition, Women Managers and Gendered Stereotypes, 33 PERSON-
NEL REv. 403, 414 (2004) (finding no significant difference in the level of intuition pos-
sessed by male and female managers). 
126. WAJCMAN, supra note 120, at 37. 
2006] AT THE ToP oF THE PYRAMm 337 
APPENDICES 
338 MARYLAND LAw REVIEW [VoL. 65:315 
APPENDIX A 
THE "ALPHA WoMEN" 2004127 
Sharon Allen Chairman, Deloitte & Touche USA LLP 
Susan Arnold Vice Chairman: Global Beauty Care, Procter & Gamble Co. 
Vivian Banta Vice Chairman and CEO, Insurance, Prudential Fin., Inc. 
Brenda Bames President and COO, Sara Lee Corp. 
Gail Berman President, Entertainment, Fox Broad. Co., News Corp. 
Cathleen Black President, Hearst Magazines, The Hearst Corp. 
Amy Woods Brinkley Chief Risk Officer, Bank of Am. Corp. 
Ursula Bums Senior Vice President, President: Business Group Operations, 
Xerox Corp. 
Debra Cafaro President and CEO, Ventas, Inc. 
Vanessa Castagna Executive Vice President; Chairman and CEO, Stores, Catalog, 
Internet, J.C. Penney Co. 
Safra Catz Co-President, Oracle Corp. 
Gina Centrella President and Publisher, Random House Publ'g, Inc. 
Zoe Cruz Worldwide Head of Fixed Income, Foreign Exchange & 
Commodities, Morgan Stanley 
Susan Decker CFO and Executive Vice President, Finance and 
Administration, Yahoo! Inc. 
Susan Desmond-Hellmann President, Product Development, Genentech, Inc. 
Linda Dillman Executive Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. 
Carty Fiorina Chairman and CEO, Hewlett-Packard Co. 
Ann Fudge Chairman and CEO, Young & Rubicam Inc. 
Deb Henretta President, Global Baby and Adult Care, Procter & Gamble Co. 
Mellody Hobson President, Ariel Capital Mgt., LLC 
Susan Ivey President and CEO, Reynolds Am. Inc. 
Abigail Johnson President, Fidelity Mgt. & Research Co. 
AndreaJung Chairman and CEO, Avon Prods., Inc. 
Karen Katen President, Executive Vice President, Global Pharm., Pfizer Inc. 
Carol Kovac General Manager, Healthcare and Life Sciences, IBM Corp. 
Sallie Krawcheck CFO, Citigroup, Inc. 
Sherry Lansing Chairman, Motion Picture Group, Paramount, Viacom Int'l 
Inc. 
Shelly Lazarus Chairman and CEO, Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide, WPP Group 
PLC 
Judy Lewent Executive Vice President and CFO; President, Human Health 
Asia, Merck & Co., Inc. 
Ann Livermore Executive Vice President, Tech. Solutions Group, Hewlett-
Packard Co. 
Judy McGrath Chairman and CEO, MTV Networks, Viacom Int'l Inc. 
127. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (describing the composition of the 



































Chairman and CEO, Global Consumer Group, Citigroup, Inc. 
CEO, Treasury and Securities Services, J.P. Morgan Chase & 
Co. 
President, Old Navy, Gap Inc. 
Chairman and CEO, Time Inc., Time Warner Inc. 
Chairman and CEO, Xerox Corp. 
Chairman and CEO, Shine Umited 
Chairman and CEO, Carlson Cos. 
President and CFO, PepsiCo Inc. 
Dollywood Co. 
Vice Chairman, Chairman of Motion Picture Group, Sony 
Corp. 
President and CEO, Travelocity, Sabre Holdings Corp. 
Executive Vice President and Managing Director, Allen & Co. 
Worldwide Chairman, Medicines and Nutritionals, Johnson & 
Johnson 
President, Commercial Operations, Genentech, Inc. 
CEO, Ovations, UnitedHealth Group Inc. 
President, National Amusements Inc. 
Executive Vice President and COO, New York Times Co. 
Chairman and CEO, Frito-Lay, PepsiCo Inc. 
Chairman and CEO, Lucent Techs. , Inc. 
President and CEO, Rite Aid Corp. 
Chairman, Universal Pictures, Gen. Elec. Co. 
Vice President: Canada, Mexico and South America, Ford 
Motor Co. 
Co-Chair, Disney Media; President, Disney-ABC Television, 
Walt Disney Co. 
Executive Vice President and CFO, Verizon Commc'n, Inc. 
Executive Vice President, Merchandising, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
President, Individual Business, MetLife, Inc. 
President and CEO, eBay Inc. 
Chairman, Harpo, Inc. 
Executive Vi~e President, Global Downstream, Chevron Corp. 
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